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NOTES
ANTITRUST DAMAGES FOR A MONOPOLIST's
CUSTOMERS AFTER BERKEY PHOTO, INC. v.
EASTMAN KODAK CO.
The private treble damage action, I historically considered the appro-
priate remedy for damages occasioned by violations of the prohibitions
against monopolies,2 faces growing criticism. The Second Circuit in
1. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reasons of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained. ....
2. The Statute of Monopolies in 1623 provided:
That if any person shall be hindered, grieved, or disquieted. . . by occasion or pretext of
any monopoly ... or any matter or thing tending as aforesaid, and will sue. . . he shall
have his remedy for the same at common law. . . ; wherein every such person, which
shall be so hindered or grieved ... shall recover three times so much as damages which
he sustained by such hinderance, etc., and double costs ....
21 Jac. 1, c.3 (1623) reprinted in BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT 24 (1856) ("An act concerning monopo-
lies and dispensations with penal laws and the forfeitures thereof."). See H. THORELLI, THE FED-
ERAL ANTITRUST POLICY-ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 26 (1955) (The Statute of
Monopolies primarily declared existing principles in the field).
The treble damage remedy was a part of the original Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 210
(1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Current law does not prohibit monopolies, only
monopolizing conduct. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides in part: "Every person
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or
persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce. . . shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony .... 1
3. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11 311-13, 331, 630c (1978) (treble
damages have negative consequences and should be reserved for well defined offenses); J. BURNS,
ANTITRUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE ANTITRUST LAWS 90-101
(1969) (treble damages are a tremendous burden on business, major antitrust questions should not
be decided in suits by private parties); Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflec-
tions on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353 (risk conscious defendant may give
plaintiff business advantage because of ambiguities in the antitrust law); Bernard, The Actions of
theAnitrust Plainl9V Law, Policy anda Modest Proposal, 16 DUQ. L. REV. 307 (1978) (permitting
plaintiff with unclean hands to sue permits plaintiff to tolerate antitrust violations in order to seek
treble damages later); Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic E ffciency: The Uneasy
Casefor Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329, 340-44 (1974) (filing of nuisance claims creates a
"misinformation effect" harmful to conducting business); Ferber, Introductory Comments, The Ef-
fectiveness of the Private Treble Damages Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Mechanism, 8 Sw.
U.L. REV. 505, 508 (1976) (diverse opinions on treble damage action include suggestions that
more effective government prosecution and more carefully considered criminal penalties should
be substituted for private action); Littman & Van Buskirk, The "Dogmas" of Antitrust Actions: A
New Perspective, 24 ANTITRUST BULL. 687, 763-66 (1979) (many aspects of private action undesir-
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Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.4 fashioned a measure of
damages that incorporates current criticism of private treble damage
actions, and may prevent the customer of a monopolist from recovering
for injury suffered as a result of the monopolist's unlawful behavior.'
Eastman Kodak's simultaneous introduction of the 110 Pocket Insta-
matic camera and Kodacolor II film6 was the focal point of an action
alleging numerous antitrust violations,7 and resulting in an $87 million
treble damage award to Berkey Camera, one of Kodak's purchasers.'
Finding Kodak guilty of monopolizing the film market in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act, the district court awarded Berkey the
difference between the price it paid for Kodak film and the price that
able such as no right of contribution); Wheeler, Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: Do They Work?,
61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319 (1973) (evidence does not indicate treble damages deter or compensate-
treble damages need to reach individual officers to be effective); Note, Antitrust Enforcement by
Private Parties: Analysis ofDevelopments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1055-62
(1952) (treble damages unduly harsh in light of uncertainty in law).
4. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (Rehnquist & Powell, J.J.,
dissenting).
5. See notes 104-05 infra and accompanying text.
6. 603 F.2d at 268.
7. Berkey claimed that Kodak willfully acquired and maintained a monopoly in the camera,
film, and color paper markets in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act; attempted to monopolize the
camera market; conspired with flashlamp manufacturers in violation of § I of the Sherman Act;
and was guilty of violations of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 267-68.
8. Id. at 268. See Petitioners Brief for Certiorari at 180a, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The jury specifically found that Kodak had:
1. monopolized the camera, film and color print markets;
2. used its monopolization in film to foreclose competition in six other markets;
3. unlawfully attempted to monopolize the conventional amateur camera market;
and
4. was a party to a contract, combination or conspiracy with Sylvania and General
Electric which unreasonably restrained trade. Id. at 180a-87a.
The court of appeals reversed thejury award in every significant aspect, summarizing the deci-
sion as follows:
DISTRICT COURT HOLDING COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING
I. Awarded Berkey $47,750,000 treble damages Reversed.
for lost profits on 110 cameras.
2. Awarded Berkey $167,100 treble damages Reversed and remanded for a new
for lost photofinishing profits. trial.
3. Awarded Berkey $57,000 treble damages for Reversed and remanded for a new
excessive prices paid for photofinishing equip- trial.
ment.
4. Awarded Berkey $34,500,000 treble damages Reversed and remanded for a new
for excessive prices paid for film. trial.
5. Granted judgment n.o.v. to Kodak on Reversed and remanded for a new
Berkey's claim for damages for excess prices trial.
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ANTITRUST DAMAGES
Berkey would have paid in a competitive market.9 The court of ap-
peals reversed and held that the proper measure of damages for a mo-
nopolist's purchaser is not the excess of its price over a competitive
price, but merely the increment attributable to its anticompetitive con-
duct. 10
This Note will explore one aspect of the Berkey decision-the proper
measure of damages for a monopolist's purchaser.1I The Note begins
with a discussion of the elements necessary to establish a cause of ac-
tion in a private antitrust suit. A brief mention of the problems and
controversy surrounding the private treble damage action will precede
discussion of the Berkey case. The Note will explore the reasoning of
both the trial court and the court of appeals to conclude that the court
of appeals, in fashioning the measure of damages, departed from estab-
lished principles of law and adopted a substantively unsound measure
of damages.
I. TREBLE DAMAGES-THE PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT
A. Purpose
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides an award of triple damages to
persons injured in their business or property as a result of conduct pro-
DISTRICT CoURT HOLDING COURT OF APPEALs HOLDING
paid for color print paper ($8,803,000, pre-
trebling, awarded by the jury).
6. Held that Kodak has violated § I of the Affirmed. Because the flip-flash
Sherman Act by conspiring with Sylvania and conspiracy was not made a sepa-
General Electric in the introduction of the rate subject of damages at the first
magicube and flip-flash systems. trial, a retrial is necessary to deter-
mine the resultant damages.
7. Awarded Berkey $990,000 treble damages Affirmed.
for lost camera sales in 1970 resulting from the
magicube conspiracy.
603 F.2d at 309.
9. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404,422 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'din
part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
10. 603 F.2d at 297.
11. For a discussion of the controversial predisclosure issue, see Comment, Antitrust Law-
Sherman Act, Section 2-A Monopolist Has No Duty to Predisclose Information on Innovations, 55
NOTRE DAME LAW. 554 (1980); Note, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Predisclo-
sure Requirement-A New Remedyfor Predatory Marketing aProduct Innovations, 10 RuT.-CAM.
L.J 395 (1979); 93 HARV. L. REV. 408 (1979).
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hibited by the antitrust laws.12 The private treble damage action, an
integral part of the antitrust laws, provides compensation for those in-
jured by a defendant's antitrust violations. 13 More importantly, the
private treble damage action deters future violations and enhances ef-
fective enforcement of the antitrust laws by encouraging private suits.' 4
At common law, private actions, as opposed to government prosecu-
tions, were the primary means to redress restraints of trade. ' 5 The Stat-
ute of Monopolies of 1623 awarded the successful private plaintiff
triple damages and double costs. 6 The framers of the Sherman Act
intended the private right of action to be a federal codification of the
common law.' 7 The purpose of the private action with its treble dam-
age provision "was not only to provide redress for private wrongs but
also to build into the act the feature of self-enforcement that had been
12. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), quoted in part in note I supra.
13. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 312-15 (1978); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 n.10 (1977); E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE
ANTITRUST ACTIONS § 3.01 (1965). See also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
14. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (consumers have standing to sue
which encourages private challenges and supplements resources of justice); Pfizer, Inc. v. India,
434 U.S. 308, 315 (1978) (foreign government permitted to sue so deterrent effect of treble dam-
ages not lessened); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745-46 (1977) (increasing costs
would impair this important enforcement weapon which permits direct purchasers to recover the
full amount of the overcharge and better serves legislative purpose to create "private attorney
general"); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1971) (Congress chose treble
damages to encourage private suits); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S.
100, 130-31 (1969) (treble damages serve "high purpose of enforcing antitrust laws"); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (law encourages private suits
to favor overriding policy in favor of competition); LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, HOUSE
SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY
PROGRAM-HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN THE ANTITRUST FIELD, 1890-1966 at 239
(1967).
At the time of enactment of the Sherman Act, the major emphasis was upon methods of
enforcement, and it was believed that the most effective method, in addition to the impo-
sition of penalties by the United States, was to provide for private treble damage suits. It
was originally hoped that this would encourage private litigants to bear a considerable
amount of the burden and expense of enforcement and thus save the government time
and money.
Id But see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485, 486 & n.10 (1977)
(treble damages deter but are primarily remedial; House debates saw as means of enforcing the
law; Senate virtually no discussion on issue).
15. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 12. See Dyer's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V. vol. 5 (1415), cited in
L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES, FREE ENTERPRISE
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 3 n.4 (1977).
16. See note 2 supra.
17. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 228 (ample evidence that bill finally passed was intended




typical in cases of restraint of trade at common law."' 8
The judiciary strongly supports the private antitrust action to achieve
the social and economic goals of the antitrust laws. 9 The treble dam-
age provision fosters and stimulates the interest of private persons in
maintaining a free and competitive economy. The courts generally
hold that the efficacy of the private antitrust action should not be weak-
ened by judicial construction.2
B. Elements of a Cause of Action
To recover under the Clayton Act the private plaintiff first must
prove damage. Proof of damage requires a showing of injury to one's
business or property2' resulting from defendant's violation of the anti-
trust laws.22 In addition, the private plaintiff must prove the amount of
damage resulting from defendant's violation of the Clayton Act.2
3
1. Proving the Fact of Damage
The fact that a defendant violates the antitrust laws, or that defend-
ant's conduct injures plaintiffs in their business or property, alone does
not create a private cause of action under the Clayton Act. The plain-
tiff must prove that the alleged violation caused the claimed injury.24
Failure to establish a causal relationship between the defendant's act
and the plaintiffs injury is a failure to prove the fact of damage.25
18. Id. at 225.
19. See, e.g., cases cited at note l4supra; E. TIMBER.LAKE, supra note 13, at § 3.02; Weinberg,
Recent Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Damage Determinations, 1976 DUKE L.J. 485.
20. See Flintkote Co. v. LysfJord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957).
21. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979), the Supreme Court held that an injury
to "business or property" includes injury suffered by consumers forced to pay conspiratorially
higher prices for goods. Id. at 337-45. Prior to this decision, some lower courts denied standing to
consumer plaintiffs, holding that injury to business or property must be a commercial or competi-
tive injury. See Note, Antitrust: Consumer Standing After Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. and Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 11 Loy. U.L.J. 327 (1980); 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 717 (1980).
22. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) ("injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws. . . ."). See, e.g., E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 13, at
§ 20.02 (fact of damage or legal injury must be proved with certainty); J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16N
BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 115.02[l] (1978) (fact
of damage or causation requires greater burden of proof than that required in showing amount of
damages).
23. See, ag., E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 13, at § 21.01; J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 22,
at § 115.03[1].
24. See notes 38-50 infra and accompanying text.
25. See E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 13, at § 21.02.
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To prove the fact of damage, the plaintiff must establish first, that the
defendant violated the antitrust laws;26 second, that the plaintiff's in-
jury was the type of injury that the antitrust laws were designed to pre-
vent;27 and finally, that the defendant's violation directly or
proximately caused the plaintiff's injury.2 The customer of a monopo-
list must show that the defendant violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act 29 by unlawfully monopolizing the relevant product market 30 to
prove a violation of the antitrust laws. The elements of unlawful mo-
nopolization are the possession of monopoly power3 in the relevant
market and "the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen, or historic accident. 32
No precise, well-settled rules exist to determine the type of conduct
that constitutes monopolization.33 Willful acquisition or maintenance
26. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). See, e.g., Glenn Coal Co. v. Dickenson Fuel Co.,
72 F.2d 885, 887 (4th Cir. 1934) (plaintiff must establish violation of the Antitrust Act and must
allege facts from which the court can determine that there has been a violation of the Act); J. VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 22, at § 115.02[l][b].
27. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). See notes 37-47
infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 45-50 infra and accompanying text.
29. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides in part: "Every person who shall monop-
olize, or attempt to monopolize... any part of trade or commerce... shall be deemed guilty of
a felony .. "
30. The relevant market includes both a product and a geographic market. The relevant
market is the "area of effective competition within which defendants operate." Standard Oil Co.
of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 300 n.5 (1949). The relevant product market is determined
by identifying those products in which cross elasticity of demand exists. United States v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956).
31. Monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition." United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377, 391 (1956); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). See also
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1911).
32. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
33. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aldper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Judge Wyzanski reviewed the leading case on monopolization and
formulated three tests of monopolizing behavior: (I) The defendant has engaged in monopolizing
behavior if engaged in predatory practices. Id. at 341 (citing United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911)). (2) The
defendant must intend to monopolize; this may be actual intent or the intent may result from a
firm's free choice of business policies. If the firm chooses the more anticompetitive of several
possible methods of doing business, the requisite intent exists. Id. at 341-42 (citing United States
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). (3) The defendant has monopolized if it
enjoys the power to exclude competition and plans to or has engaged in any exclusionary practice
even though that practice does not restrain competition. Judge Wyzanski suggests that a domi-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/9
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of monopoly power may include conduct that would be lawful if en-
gaged in by a company without monopoly power.34 There are, how-
ever, few cases that define monopolizing conduct .3  The dearth of well-
settled rules has advanced the argument that treble damages are not
appropriate unless defendant has engaged in clearly anticompetitive
nant firm may be monopolizing by simply doing business and flexing its economic muscles. A
dominant firm may use superior skill as a defense. The approach suggests that possession of
monopoly power shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show that its power resulted from
superior skill. Id. at 342 (citing United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948)). See generally 3 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1613 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST §§ 33-48 (1977).
34. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aft'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (leasing rather than selling machines is monopolizing). See also
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (defendant's plans to meet
increased demand is monopolizing conduct).
35. Malina, Recent Developments in Monopolization Litigation, 47 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 1135
(1978). Malina refers to section 2 as the "most ephemeral of the antitrust laws" and says you can
count the important precedent on two hands. Id. at 1135-36 n.4. United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563 (1966) (offense of monopoly has two elements-possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and willful acquisition and maintenance of that power); United States v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (relevant market for determining the power to con-
trol price and exclude competition contains those commodities reasonably interchangeable by
consumers for same purpose); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948) (use of monopoly
power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, gain competitive advantage, or de-
stroy a competitor violates section 2); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (plug compatible peripheral products too narrow product market
while use of ordinary market methods and pricing practices prevalent throughout industry is not
"predatory"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (to violate
section 2 must have intent, but no monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing and
corporation which embraces each new opportunity cannot argue that they never excluded compe-
tition); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953) (economic
effect of lease only policy exclusionary and defendant intends to engage in leasing practices which
maintain its market power). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377
(1973) (defendant's use of its dominance in transmisson of power in its service area to foreclose
potential entrants is attempt to monopolize); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S.
781, 809-10 (1946) (combination to control commerce in a commodity violates section 2 if coupled
with power and intent to exclude competitiors even if the means lawful, competition not excluded,
and prices not raised); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927)
(mere size of a corporation or existence of unexercised power is not an offense if not unlawful
conduct in the exercise of power); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51
(1920) (mere size is not an offense); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 175-84
(1911) (violation alone not a result of the existence of dominion and control over tobacco trade
but because wrongful purpose and illegal combination established); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62, 75-77 (1911) (section 2 embraces all attempts to restrain trade by
attempts to monopolize or by monopolization).
For comment on recent monopolization cases, see Comment, Draining the Alcoa "Wishing
Well'" The Section 2 Conduct Requirement After Kodak and Calcomp, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 291
(1980).
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behavior.36
Private plaintiffs may not recover merely because a defendant vio-
lated the antitrust laws. 37 The private plaintiff also must prove an in-
jury of the type that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. 38 The
Supreme Court, in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Ma, Inc. ,39 re-
fused to impose section 4 liability on the defendant Brunswick when
defendant's violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act4° injured plaintiff
in its business. Brunswick had violated section 7 by its acquisition of a
bowling alley that competed with plaintiff, Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat. The
plaintiff alleged that "but for" defendant's illegal acquisition, the com-
peting business acquired by the defendant would have ceased doing
business. 41 Plaintiff sought damages based on the amount of business
lost to the defendant. Although defendant's violation caused plaintiff's
loss, the Court held that the plaintiff did not suffer an "injury of the
type antitrust laws were designed to prevent. 42 Injury resulting merely
from the presence of competition is not the type of injury protected by
the antitrust laws. 43
36. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at § 630c. "[S]uch damages are punitive, and
punishment is inappropriate when ... the law is unclear, or even where the liability determina-
tion rests on... uncertain economic factual determinations." Id.
37. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 (1976) (to re-
cover damages plaintiff must prove more than that defendant violated an antitrust law); Wolfe v.
National Lead Co., 15 F.R.D. 61, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aj'd, 225 F.2d 427 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 915 (1955) (forbidden acts not relevant if they did not result in private damage). See also
United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 519 (1954) (government did not expect private plaintiff
to function as attorney general).
38. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977):
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlaw-
ful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of an-
ticompetitive acts made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be "the type of loss
that the claimed violations ... would be likely to cause."
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
125 (1969) (Court could infer causal relationship between injury and antitrust violation); Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 697 (1962) (may infer cause if loss and
violation likely to cause that type of loss).
39. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) provides in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall ac-
quire... another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce. . . the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monop-
oly."
41. 429 U.S. at 481.
42. Id. at 487-88.
43. Id. An elementary principle in the law of damages is that defendants are liable only
when their tortious conduct invades a legally protected interest--an interest protected against a
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/9
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The final element of proof of fact of damage' requires a showing
that the violation complained of was the direct 45 and proximate cause
46
of the plaintiff's injury.47 Although the violative act must be a substan-
tial factor in causing the harm,4 8 the act need not be the only factor.4 9
hazard by some rule of law. See L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE § 1_(1929); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9, comment a (1967). In contrast to the Brunswick fact pattern,
the predatory practices of a deep pockets entry into the market is the hazard against which plain-
tifts profits are protected. 429 U.S. at 487.
44. Fact of damage relates to the plaintiff's standing to sue. The risk of multiplicity of suits
requires the courts to place some proximity limitations on antitrust plaintiffs. Hoffman, Antitrust
Standing., Congress Responds to Illinois Brick, 1978 WASH. U.L.Q. 529, 531. Discussion of the
Supreme Court's denial of the offensive use of the "passing on" doctrine limiting standing to
direct purchasers as announced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), is beyond the
scope of this Note. For an understanding of the standing doctrine and controversy, see Fair and
Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Law. Hearings on S, 1874 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopol; of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2 (1978); Hoffman,
supra. at 529; Note, Antitrust: Consumer Standing After Reiter v. Sonotone Corp. and Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, I I LOYOLA U.L.J. 327 (1980); Comment, A Legal and Economic Anaysis of
the Cost Plus Contract Exception in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 743
(1980). See generally Pollack, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of njury, and the Passing-On Doctrine,
32 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 5 (1966).
45. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d Cir. 1910) ("Moreover, it is manifest
that the plaintiff did not receive any direct injury from the alleged illegal acts of the defend-
ant .... [A]ny injury which he ... received was indirect, remote .... "); L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 33, at § 247 (injury derivative in nature may not be sustained); E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note
13. at § 4.02. See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (directness is more
restrictive test to determine when wrongdoer should not be liable),
46. Proximate cause, used interchangeably with the term legal cause, signifies a causal rela-
tionship between defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury which is substantial enough that the
law considers it just to hold defendant responsible. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 5,
9, 431, comment a (1967); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 266, 267
(1935).
47. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 22, at § 115.02[1][b]. "The basic thrust of the proof in
any private treble damage action is that plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the defend-
ant's proscribed conduct. Generally this means that but for the antitrust violation the plaintiff
would have been in a more favorable economic position." Id.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431, comment a (1967). See C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 46, at 266, 267.
49. Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 885 (Ist Cir. 1966) (even if
market factors contributed to plaintiff's injury, plaintiff in an antitrust action not barred merely
because factors other than defendant's unlawful conduct contributes to injury); Haverhill Gazette
Co. v. Union Leader Corp., 333 F.2d 798, 806 n.16 (Ist Cir. 1964) (question is not primarily extent
of damage when there are multiple causes because there is no burden of excluding all other causes
of loss); Momand v. Universal Film Exchs., 172 F.2d 37, 43 (Ist Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
967 (1949) (there are a number of factors which contributed to plaintiff's injury, but usual tort rule
is that plaintiff may recover loss to which defendant's wrongful conduct substantially contributed).
See also Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide, 370 U.S. 690, 699, 700 (1962) (plaintiffs need not
show that they had exhausted other sources before they could claim damage from defendant's
acts).
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The injury suffered by the plaintiff must flow "from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the anticompeti-
tive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possi-
ble by that violation."5
2. Proving the Amount of Damage
Although damages cannot be entirely speculative, 5' courts hold that
less certainty is required to prove the amount of damage once plaintiff
has proven the fact of damage.12 The method used to measure dam-
ages will differ with the type of violation and the relationship between
plaintiff and defendant.53 Competitors, for example, may recover lost
profits by comparing plaintiffs profits before defendant's antitrust vio-
lation with plaintiffs profits after the violation.54 Customers who pay a
higher price because of a price-fixing conspiracy are entitled to recover
the difference between the price paid and a competitive or reasonable
price.5 When defendants conspire to lower prices to drive a competi-
tor out of business, the plaintiff may recover the difference between the
price prevailing at the time plaintiff entered the market and the price at
which defendant's conduct forced plaintiff to sell goods.56
50. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931) (damages
may not be proved by mere speculation, but sufficient proof exists if evidence shows extent of
damages as a matter ofjust and reasonable inference); National Wrestling Alliance v. Meyers, 325
F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1963) (tendency of courts is to award damages when wrong is perpetrated. but
not allow recovery for loss of prospective profits based on mere speculation); Loew's, Inc. v. Cin-
ema Amusements, Inc., 210 F.2d 86 (10th Cir.) (damages will not be speculative because they
cannot be measured with mathematical exactness), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 976 (1954).
52. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931)
(citing Taylor v. Bradley, 4 Abb. Pr. 363, 366-67 (N.Y. 1868)): "The rule which precludes the
recovery of uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to
those damages which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their
amount."
53. See generally J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 22, at § 115.03[].
54. Id. at § 115.0313].
55. See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) ("The plaintiffs alleged a charge over a
reasonable rate and the amount of it. If the charge be true that more than a reasonable rate was
secured by the combination, the excess over what was reasonable was an element of injury."); City
of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 27 (6th Cir. 1903), a4 9'd, 203 U.S. 390
(1906) ("If the effect of a combination [is] to enhance the price of a commodity... the difference
between what he was thus compelled to pay and the reasonable price of the commodity under
natural competitive conditions would be an injury to that business directly resulting from such
unlawful combination.").
56. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (1931).
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In Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 5 7 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of the amount of damages a purchaser may
recover from a monopolist. In Hanover Shoe the court found defend-
ant's leasing practice a monopolizing activity. 8 In discussing proof of
amount of damages the Court held that a customer proves a prima fa-
cie case of injury and damage under section 4 of-the Clayton Act when
defendant's conduct inflated the price paid by the customer for business
materials.59
3. Burden of Proof on Fact and Amount of Damages
The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to simplify proof of
damage.6" The Court has consistently held that in proving damage the
defendant bears the risk of uncertainty caused by his improper con-
duct.6 In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 62 the
Supreme Court held that antitrust plaintiffs may recover damages al-
though the damages cannot be calculated with absolute exactness. The
Court explained that a defendant is not entitled to complain that dam-
ages cannot be measured with exactness or precision because defend-
57. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
58. Id. at 485-86.
59. We think it sound to hold that when a buyer shows that the price paid by him for
materials purchased for use in his business is illegally high and also shows the amount of
the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury and damage within the
meaning of § [4].
Id. at 489. See also note 52 supra and accompanying text.
60. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745 (1977).
The concern in Hanover Shoe for the complexity that would be introduced into treble-
damages suits if pass-on theories were permitted was closely related to the Court's con-
cern for the reduction in the effectiveness of those suits. . . . The apportionment of the
recovery ... would increase the overall costs of recovery by injecting extremely com-
plex issues into the case. . . . This additional uncertainty would further reduce the in-
centive to sue. The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits of
bringing a treble-damages action would seriously impair this important weapon of anti-
trust enforcement.
We think the longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous private enforcement of the
antitrust laws ... supports our adherence to the Hanover Shoe rule ....
Id.
61. To deny the injured party the right to recover any actual damages in such cases,
because they are of a nature which cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to en-
able parties to profit by, and speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage violence and
invite depredation. Such is not, and cannot be the law ....
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 564 (1931). Accord Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pic-
tures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264-65 (1946); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273
U.S. 359, 379 (1927).
62. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
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ant's wrongful conduct is responsible for the difficulty in ascertaining
the precise damages suffered by the plaintiff.63
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Story Parchment Co.
v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. I In Story Parchment the court of
appeals reversed a jury award reasoning that "pure conjecture" was
necessary to determine if the conspiracy to lower prices actually forced
prices below a normal competitive response to plaintiffs entry into the
market. 65 On appeal the Supreme Court reversed and ruled that al-
though the extent of the damage was uncertain, the fact of damage was
indisputable.66
Greater certainty generally is required to establish the fact of dam-
age than is necessary to prove the amount of damage. 67 The Supreme
Court, however, in several cases lightened the burden of proving the
fact of damage. 61 In Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, Inc. 69 the Supreme
Court reinstated a lower court damage award and found that plaintiff's
evidence "tended to show damage."7 The Court explained that the
jury could reasonably conclude from proof of the defendant's wrongful
acts and the acts' tendency to injure plaintiffs business that defendant's
63. Id. at 379. Kodak and other suppliers sold Southern photographic materials, necessary to
Southern's business, at dealer discounts. Kodak acquired all the plaintiff's competition and at-
tempted unsuccessfully to purchase Southern. Kodak refused to sell to Southern except at retail
prices after the unsuccessful acquisition. Kodak argued that the sale of its goods represented only
a small part of the plaintiffs sales and that the damages were purely speculative and "not of an
amount susceptible of expression in figures." Id. at 378.
64. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
65. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Story Parchment Co., 37 F.2d 537, 539 (1st Cir. 1930),
rev'd, 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
66. Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (1931).
67. It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was
none as to the fact of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of
proof necessary to establish the fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the
measure of proof necessary to enable the jury to fix the amount.
Id. at 562; Flintkote Co. v. LysfJord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
See also Wolfe v. National Lead Co., 225 F.2d 427, 433 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 915
(1955).
68. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 124 (1969); Hanover Shoe
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 257 (1946); Wein-
berg, supra note 19, at 490. This commentator suggests that defendant should bear the risk of
uncertainty caused by his improper conduct in proving the fact of damage and the amount of
damage. His analysis of Supreme Court cases indicates the Court imposes that two-fold burden
on defendants. Id. See notes 69-79 infra and accompanying text.
69. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
70. Id. at 260.
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acts caused the damages.7'
The Supreme Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research
Inc. 72 permitted a trier of fact to infer the necessary causal connection
between defendant's violation and plaintiffs injury after plaintiff
proved a type of loss normally caused by that antitrust violation.73 The
Court in Zenith held plaintiffs evidence, although not conclusive, to be
"sufficient" to sustain the inference that plaintiff had been injured by
defendant's restraints.74 The Court noted that the burden of proving
fact of damage "is satisfied by. . .proof of some damage flowing from
the unlawful conspiracy; inquiry beyond this minimum point goes only
to the amount and not the fact of damage."
75
71. Id. at 264. In Bigelow the owner of a motion picture theatre brought an action alleging a
conspiracy in the distribution of films. The court of appeals held that plaintiffs' evidence did not
demonstrate what their earnings would have been in the absence of the illegal distribution because
the conspiracy existed throughout the earnings period used to determine plaintiffs lost profits.
Justice Frankfurter in dissent argued that plaintiff had not proven injury or fact of damage. Jus-
tice Frankfurter stated that the issue was whether the respondents' violation of the Sherman Act
illegally injured the petitioner. Id. at 267-68 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See Donovan & Irvine,
Proof qDamages: Under the 4nti-Trust Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV., 511 (1940).
See also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561 (193 1). The
Supreme Court held that there was not uncertainty of fact of damage. The court of appeals,
however, was not certain that the combination was the "but for" cause of plaintiffs injury. "The
error in the plaintiffs contention is the assumption that, but for the alleged unlawful conspiracy of
the defendants. . . the prices current in November, 1927, would have continued to prevail, as-
suming them to be fair and reasonable." Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Story Parchment Co.,
37 F.2d 537, 539, 540 (1st Cir. 1930), rev'd, 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
The court of appeals noted that individuals may lawfully reduce prices to meet competition. Id.
at 540. "[I]t is, we think, a moral certainty that, according to nature's first law, each of the three
old companies, if no combination had existed, in order to hold their trade, would at least have met
every reduction in price made by the plaintiff to gain trade. ... Id. at 541. The court con-
cluded: "The plaintiff has not, therefore, sustained the burden of proving that it has suffered any
measurable damage. . . by reason of the alleged unlawful conspiracy." Id.
If plaintiff had shown that defendant's conduct forced prices below a normal competitive re-
sponse, the court of appeals would have been satisfied because both the fact and amount of dam-
age would have been shown. The Supreme Court did not require that degree of certainty. 282
U.S. at 565 (the defendant should bear the risk of uncertainty caused by his improper conduct).
See Note, Damages-Loss of Profits Caused by Breach of Contract-Proof of Certainty, 17 MINN.
L. REV. 194, 196 (1933) (fact of loss and proof of loss are in effect "the same thing").
72. 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
73. Id. at 125 (because Zenith alleged precisely the type of injury the claimed violation was
likely to cause-inability to secure comparable market because of license denial--causal relation
may be inferred). See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690, 700
(1962) (cannot deem injury flowing from the elimination of independent supplier too remote, nor
must plaintiff be required to exhaust all sources of supply because the evidence is sufficient to infer
the necessary causal connection between injury and violation).
74. 395 U.S. at 114.
75. Id. at 114 n.9 (emphasis in original). "It is enough that the illegality is shown to be a
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The Supreme Court in Hanover Shoe7 6 rejected the defense that if
plaintiff passes on overcharges to the consumer, the plaintiff has not
been injured and should not recover.77 The Court noted that many
factors influence pricing policies and thus rejected the "passing on" de-
fense because it requires proof of an unascertainable figure.78 The al-
lowance of a pass-on defense with its attendant complexities would
reduce the effectiveness of treble damage actions and allow monopo-
lists to retain the fruits of their illegality.79
The Supreme Court decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc. ,80 may, however, indicate an intent on the part of the Court
to increase the burden of proof of the fact of damage. In addition to
holding that plaintiff must prove injury of the type the antitrust laws
were designed to prevent, the Court in Brunswick required the injury to
flow "from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful."8 " The Bruns-
wick decision may have far reaching consequences if the language in
the opinion is interpreted to allow plaintiffs to recover only for injuries
that flow from the anticompetitive aspects of a defendant's behavior.8 2
This interpretation would force courts to articulate precisely the por-
tion of defendant's conduct that is anticompetitive.8 3
Brunswick does not, however, necessarily alter the amount of proof
necessary to show the fact of damage. The defendant in Brunswick
unlawfully acquired bowling alleys in violation of the antimerger pro-
vision of the Clayton Act.84 The purpose of the antimerger provision is
to prevent mergers that tend to lessen competition and increase concen-
material cause of the injury; a plaintiff need not exhaust all possible alternative sources of injury
in fulfilling his burden of proving compensable injury under § 4." Id.
76. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
77. Id. at 491-92.
78. Id. at 493.
79. Id. at 493-94. For further examination of Hanover, see Pollock, Automatic Treble Dam-
ages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183 (1968);
Note, The Hanover Shoe Misunderstanding, 9 NEw ENG. L. REv. 473 (1974); Note, The Effect of
Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98 (1972).
80. 429 U.S. 477 (1972). See also notes 39-42 supra and acccompanying text.
81. 429 U.S. at 489.
82. Baxter, A Review of the Supreme Court's Antitrust Philosophy: Placing /he Burger Court in
Historical Perspective, 47 ABA ANTITRUST LJ. 803 (1978).
83. "If this process is undertaken conscientiously, the courts inevitably will become aware
that large portions of present antitrust doctrine prohibit conduct which is not anticompetitive at
all." Id. at 816.




tration in an industry. The plaintiffs interest in a reduction of com-
petition was clearly not an interest protected by the antitrust laws. The
antimerger provision was designed to protect the plaintiff against the
predatory practices of a deep pockets entry into the market, which
would lessen a plaintiffs ability to compete.86 Thus, Brunswick's re-
quirement that the injury be of the type which antitrust laws are
designed to prevent, is not a departure from previous damage deci-
sions. The requirement that the "injuries flow from that which makes
the defendant's acts unlawful"8 7 affirms the need to show proximate
causation. 8
The Court in Brunswick followed a well-established method of prox-
imate cause analysis in requiring proof of antitrust injury:8 9 To estab-
lish liability, defendant must violate some rule of law, which protects
an interest against a particular hazard. In Brunswick the interest pro-
tected was the plaintiffs interest in unimpeded competition from
hazards that result from the predatory practices of a deep pockets entry
into the market. The antimerger provision of the Clayton Act was the
rule of law violated by the defendant.90 Brunswick rejects the argu-
ment that a plaintiff need only demonstrate that defendant violated an
antitrust law which places plaintiff in an economically worse position
than if defendant had not committed the anticompetitive acts. 9' The
85. Section 7 of the Clayton act prohibits corporate acquisitions when the effect is to substan-
tially lessen competition or the acquisition tends to create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
Section 7 was intended to be a monopoly preventive measure. Note, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., Injury and Causation Under Sections 4 and 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 10 Sw. U.L.
REV. 667, 668 (1978). See Note, Section 7ofthe Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L.
REV. 766, 766 (1952).
Initially, many federal district courts prohibited damage recoveries for a section 7 violation
because the statute is directed toward potential restraints of trade. A potential restraint cannot
injure. J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 22, at § 115.03[4]. See Note, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., Injury and Causation Under Sections 4 and 7 ofthe Clayton Act, 10 Sw. U. L.
REV. 667. 689 (1978) ("[The statutory intendment test of injury and causation is premised upon
the unique feature of both section 7 and section 4."). See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 3, at § 346a; Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127
(1976).
86. See 429 U.S. 477, 487, 489 n.14 (1977).
87. Id. at 489.
88. "Proximate damages ... are such as flow proximately from the cause of action, that are
so connected with it as results of it, that the law regards the person responsible for the cause of
action as responsible also for them." A. SEDGwiCK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 45, 46
(2d ed. 1909).
89. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE § 1 (1927).
90. See 429 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1977).
91. Id. at 486-87.
Number 1]
Washington University Open Scholarship
188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Brunswick rule insists that the interest invaded by the defendant be an
identifiable, legally protected interest. 92 The Brunswick analysis does
not represent a departure from antitrust decisions that require the de-
fendant to bear the burden of proving damages which result from its
illegal behavior when defendant's violation creates the type of injury
suffered by plaintiff.93 Moreover, antitrust decisions after Brunswick
have reaffirmed the importance of the treble damage action as a deter-
rent to violations of the antitrust laws and have reiterated the necessity
of maintaining its effectiveness as a private enforcement mechanism.94
Judicial support of the private treble damage action as a private en-
forcement mechanism further precludes an interpretation of Brunswick
that would increase the plaintiffs burden of proof as to fact and
amount of damage in a private treble damage action.95
II. PROBLEMS AND CONTROVERSIES SURROUNDING PRIVATE
TREBLE DAMAGE ACTIONS
The desirability and effectiveness of the treble damage action is the
subject of controversy. 96 The overwhelming number of private anti-
trust actions indicates that treble damages provide an incentive to bring
suit.97 Treble damage actions, however, may not provide the desired
compliance with the antitrust laws or deter violations of the antitrust
laws.98 A violation, rather than compliance with the antitrust laws,
92. See also J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 22, at § 115.02[3][b][iij.
93. See notes 69-79 supra and accompanying text.
94. In Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979), standing to sue was extended to
consumer plaintiffs because the treble damage action was designed to encourage private chal-
lenges and to supplement the limited resources of the Department of Justice. Id. In Pfizer, Inc. v.
India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978), the Court permitted a foreign nation to bring an action under
section 4 of the Clayton Act because the Sherman Act advocates the private action to deter viola-
tors and deprive them of the fruits of their illegality. See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720, 745 (1977). The Court refused to permit indirect purchasers to maintain an action for
overcharges resulting from a violation of the Sherman Act because, "[t]he combination of increas-
ing the costs and diffusing the benefits of bringing a treble-damages action could seriously impair
this important weapon of antitrust enforcement." Id.
95. See notes 13, 14, 69-79 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 3 supra.
97. CoHen, Procedural Directions in Antitrust Treble Damage Litigation: An Overview of
Changing JudicialAttitudes, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 997, 998-99 (1972) (statistics show trend of in-
creasing private actions after Bigelow's simplification of proof of damages and the Electrical
Equipment cases). For a thorough discussion of the Electric Equipment cases, see Neal &
Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A.J.
621 (1964).
98. Erickson, The Protfiability of Violating the Antitrust Laws: Dissolution and Treble Dam-
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may be profitable to the offender despite the imposition of a substantial
treble damage award.99 The private antitrust action may lead to settle-
ments that restrain trade." ° Additionally, the large number of suits
that erroneously allege anticompetitive effects may create a "misinfor-
mation effect."10' Finally, the nondiscretionary nature of the imposi-
tion of treble damages may be the most objectionable feature of the
treble damage action.0 2
Commentators who favor judicial discretion in treble damage
awards argue that treble damages are penal in nature and should be
used only when violations are worthy of criminal prosecution. 0 3 Sup-
porters of judicial discretion regard certain exclusionary acts as not jus-
tifying treble damages and believe damages should be limited to the
amount reasonably attributable to the exclusionary conduct. 1°4 The
Second Circuit position in Berkey that "an injured plaintiff is not enti-
tled to have damages based on the excess of the monopoly price over
the competitive price, but only to the price increment reasonably attrib-
utable to actionable behavior' 0 5 reflects dissatisfaction with both the
ages in PrivateAntitrust, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. Rav. 101 (1972) (damage awards are generally
smaller than profits involved because cost-benefit ratio favors violations); Wheeler, Antitrust
Treble Damage Actions: Do they Work?, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 1319 (1973) (inadequate empirical
evidence to justify faith in treble damage actions as a deterrent or compensatory mechanism).
99. Erickson, supra note 98, at 102-03.
100. Austin, Negative Effect of Treble Damage Actions: Reqlection on the New Antitrust Strat-
egy, 1978 DUKE LJ. 1353, 1353-54 (risk conscious defendant might give plaintiff business advan-
tages because of ambiguities in the antitrust law).
101. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement and Economic Eiciency The Uneasy Casefor
Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & EcON. 329, 340-44 (1974) (labelling nuisance claims as treble damages
creates a "misinformation effect").
102. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 331b3 (difficulties could be amelio-
rated if trebling were discretionary rather than mandatory).
103. Id at 630c (treble damages are punitive and inappropriate when the law is unclear and
liability rests on uncertain economic factual determinations).
104. Id. A more appropriate remedy might be the use of injunctive relief to break up a persis-
tent monopoly even if there is no exclusionary conduct. See id. at § 600b (conduct component
might be varied with degree of power, eliminating conduct element entirely in the face of durable
and great power); Brookshire & Carroll, Patents and Vertical Integration as a Source ofMonopoly
Power: The Photographic Industry, 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. no. 1, 49, 50 (1974) (no scale
economies or legitimate patent justification for monopoly conditions in this industry-vertical
dissolution of Kodak is appropriate remedy); Dougherty, Kirkwood, & Hurwitz, Elimination ofthe
Conduct Requirement in Government Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 83 (1980)
(proposing elimination of conduct requirement and structural relief as the primary form of relief).
105. 603 F.2d 263, 298 n.57 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (quoting 3 P.
ARE.DA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 73).
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lack of judicial discretion in treble damage awards and the dearth of
well-settled rules defining monopolizing conduct.
III. BEKEY PHOTo, INC. v. EASTMAN KoDAK Co. -FILM AND
COLOR PAPER CLAIMS
Kodak's system of marketing their pocket instamatic camera was the
subject of the antitrust suit brought by Berkey against Kodak. In 1973
Kodak's sale of 5.1 million pocket instamatics captured a significant
share of the amateur camera market.1"6 Berkey Photo, a competitor
and customer of Kodak, 0 7 alleged that Kodak introduced a line of
defective film which was unnecessary to the operation of the pocket
camera. 08 Kodak intended to employ a "systems" method of product
introduction and to monopolize the camera and film market in viola-
tion of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'0 9
106. Kodak sold 2,984,000 pocket instamatic cameras in 1972. This was 50% of Kodak's total
sales of amateur conventional still cameras and 30% of the total industry sales in that market. Id.
at 278.
107. Id. at 267. Kodak is the leader in the photographic market with monopoly power in the
relevant camera, film, and color paper markets. Id. at 269-71. In 1977 Berkey's sales were $203
million while Kodak's were $6 billion. Kiechel, The Strange Case fKodak's Lawyers, FORTUNE,
May 8, 1978, at 189.
Berkey Photo has been in the photofinishing business since 1933. A 1954 consent decree that
prohibited Kodak from tying film processing to film purchase enabled Berkey and other film
processors to process color film. Since 1954 Berkey has become a larger film processor of 126 and
110 film than Kodak.
Berkey also competed through its Keystone division between 1968-1978 with Kodak in the am-
ateur still camera market. Berkey buys Kodak film, color paper, and other photofinishing equip-
ment and also retails Kodak film and cameras. 603 F.2d at 267-71.
108. The new film contained several defects, which according to Berkey, Kodak concealed
from the public. The defects included "graininess and keeping" qualities. Employees suggested
use of the 126 film, already on the market for the new camera, because Kodacolor II was not ready
for introduction. The film defects were significant enough that Kodak considered recalling all film
spooled as of January 1972. Brief of Appellee at 27, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). Scientists furthir expressed concern that there was no need for the
new film because small improvements in existing film (Kodacolor) would suffice and the new
process "would raise hell in the photofinishing business.., and the ultimate consumer would not
benefit." 603 F.2d at 277 n.16.
109. 603 F.2d at 277 n.16. Berkey alleged that Kodak's simultaneous introduction of the 110
camera and Kodacolor H film was anticompetitive because Kodak's film monopoly prevented any
other camera manufacturer from marketing such a system. Kodak generally made film to fit only
its cameras, which prevented other camera makers from developing cameras in new formats. Id.
at 270.
Berkey alleged that because the new film was unnecessary and defective, Kodak did not intend
to compete on the merits, but rather intended to use its film monopoly to crush competitors. 457
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A federal district court jury awarded Berkey over $20 million 10 be-
cause of excessive prices paid by Berkey for film and color print paper.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the three separate hold-
ings of the district court.' 1 First, the court of appeals reversed a judg-
ment in favor of Kodak on the color paper claim 12 and held that a
plaintiff may introduce proof of anticompetitive acts occurring before
the four year statute of limitations' 3 to support a recovery of damages
incurred within the four year period." 4 Second, the court of appeals
reversed and remanded the findings of monopolization. ' 5 The court
F. Supp. 404, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a f'd in part and rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
110. 603 F.2d at 293. Berkey was awarded single damages of 15% of its purchases. Berkey
contended that even if Kodak's prices had been lower by 30%, Kodak's profits would still have
been at extraordinarily high levels. A pro forma statement of Kodak's sales and profits from 1969
to 1976 indicated that with a price reduction of 30%, Kodak's return on investment would have
been between 28.4% and 32.8%; earnings as a percentage of sales would have been between 36.4%
and 42.3%. Post-Argument Brief for Appellee at 24-25 & n.55, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Brookshire & Carroll, supra note 104, at 49
(Kodak, the nation's top monopoly overcharger, had earnings averaging slightly more than Gen-
eral Motors from 1962-1971); Scanlon, FTC and Phase Il The "McGovern Papers", 5 ANTITRUST
L. & EcON. REV. no. 3, 19, 33-36 (1972) (FTC estimates of monopoly margin credit the photogra-
phy industry with maintaining the highest monopoly margin-11.1%).
111. 603 F.2d at 293-99.
112. To demonstrate that Kodak's monopoly was a result of its earlier unlawful acquisitions,
Berkey sought to introduce evidence of a 1915 court decision which had found that Kodak mo-
nopolized the film and color print paper markets. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62,
79-80 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), appeal dismissed, 255 U.S. 578 (1920). The allegations resulting in a ver-
dict against Kodak included the acquisition of twenty competing companies, the sale of supplies
under restrictions that prohibited dealers from handling or selling competitive products, which
resulted in a forfeiture of dealer's ability to handle Kodak products if the dealer did not comply
with the restriction. Id. at 63-64.
113. Clayton Act § 4(b), 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976) provides: "Any action to enforce any cause of
action shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action ac-
crued."
114. 603 F.2d at 295.
So long as a monopolist continues to use the power it has gained illicitly to overcharge
its customers, it has no claim on the repose that a statute of limitations is intended to
provide....
Plainly, at the time a monopolist commits anticompetitive conduct it is entirely specu-
lative how much damage that action will cause its purchasers in the future: Indeed, some
of the buyers who will later feel the brunt of the violation may not even be in existence at
the time .... Not until the monopolist actually sets an inflated price and its customers
determine the amount of their purchases can a reasonable estimate be made. The pur-
chaser's cause of action, therefore, accrues only on the date damages are "suffered."
Id. (citations omitted). For an analysis of this holding, see 48 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 643 (1980).
115. Berkey alleged seven different types of anticompetitive or exclusionary conduct that af-
fected the film market:
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stated that because the jury verdict was a general one, the court could
not determine the specific actions that the jury found anticompeti-
tive.116
Finally, Kodak argued at trial that even if evidence supported a find-
ing of anticompetitive action affecting the film market, Berkey must
show that the monopolizing acts directly and proximately resulted in
the overcharge paid by Berkey." 7 The district court rejected Kodak's
argument in favor of a competitive price theory. The district court held
that if the defendant acquired or maintained monopoly power by an-
ticompetitive conduct, a customer of the defendant is entitled to re-
cover the entire difference between monopoly price charged and the
price that would have existed in a freely competitive market.'18 The
1. "The evidence would not support a finding that the film monopoly was 'thrust
upon' Kodak." Brief for Appellee at 31-33, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
2. "Kodak manipulated the photofinishing market to exclude other film makers."
Id. at 33-34.
3. "CP&P's exclusionary refusal to process films of others." Id. at 34-35.
4. "The imposition of a new processing system and the use of Kodak's camera mo-
nopoly to advantage Kodak as a film manufacturer." Id. at 36-37.
5. "The exclusionary use of systems advertising and pricing." Id. at 37-38.
6. "Kodak's paper monopoly leveraged film sales." Id. at 38.
7. "Anticompetitive practices as to foreign Kodak film." Id. at 39.
The district court found sufficient evidence of anticompetitive actions that maintained Kodak's
huge share of the film market. See 457 F. Supp. at 421.
The district court noted that the introduction of the I10 system and Kodak's refusal to allow
their photofinisher, CP&P, to handle non-Kodak film were flagrant anticompetitive acts. The
record, according to the court, demonstrated that the refusal to handle other films purposefully
and effectively impeded film competition. Id. at 422.
116. 603 F.2d at 299. If, on remand, the court again found that Kodak monopolized the film
and color paper markets, the jury awards could not be reinstated because the court of appeals
fashioned a new measure of damages for a monopolist's purchaser. See notes 122-30 infra and
accompanying text.
117. 457 F. Supp. at 422. Kodak, on appeal, argued that Berkey did not show that the 110
systems introduction related to or affected Kodak's film prices. Thus, the claim should be dis-
missed for failure to prove cause-in-fact. Brief for Appellant at 114, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. East-
man Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (1979).
118. 457 F. Supp. at 422.
Stated more fully, the rule on which the verdict rests in this respect is that where a
defendant
(i) has monopoly power in a relevant market,
(ii) has acquired or maintained this power by anticompetitive conduct, and
(iii) has employed its monopoly power to charge a price higher than what a
competitive price was or would have been,
a purchaser required to pay the monopoly price may recover the excess.
Id.
Judge Frankel compares this position with a price-fixing conspiracy. An illegal monopolist's
power to set price is the "same species of evil, and for at least as compelling reasons, as the
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court instructed the jury to determine whether the price paid by Berkey
for film was higher than the price would have been in the absence of
Kodak's monopolization of the film market.119 The court also in-
formed the jury that Berkey could not recover if higher quality, better
marketing methods, superior service, and customer preference caused
the higher prices. 20 The district court limited recovery to the excess
price attributable to Kodak's possession of monopoly power in the rele-
vant market.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court award, and held that a
purchaser is not entitled to damages based on a competitive price
formula. 2' A purchaser may recover from the monopolist only the
"price increment caused by the anticompetitive conduct that originated
or augmented the monopolist's control over the market." 122 The court
-of appeals labeled this measure the wrongful conduct rule123 because
the rule premises damages on the monopolist's actual record of miscon-
duct.' 24 The court by using the Brunswick rule125 found that excessive
prices are the type of injury the antitrust laws were designed to pre-
vent.' 26 Because a legal monopolist may use monopoly pricing, 2 7
however, a "purchaser may recover only for the price increment that
'flows from' the distortion of the market caused by the monopolist's
unlawful power of conspirators to set their price." Id. at 423 (emphasis in original). Additionally,
because the intended proximate consequence of a monopolist's conduct is to obtain a monopolist
price, the monopolist should be liable. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 442.
121. 603 F.2d at 297.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. The court dismissed cases involving monopoly overcharges that stem from a price-fixing
conspiracy.
There is a dearth of cases on point. . . .The reason for this lack of authority is that in
most successful monopolization suits brought by purchasers the § 2 violation was merely
a consequence of a § I offense that provided the rule of damages. Often, for example,
the § 2 violation consists of a price-fixing conspiracy among firms controlling a large
share of the market. The measure of the damages to one of the conspirators' customers is
the difference between the price actually paid and the one at which the product would
have sold absent the conspiracy .... In such a case, the monopoly price is entirely
attributable to the anticompetitive conduct.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
126. 603 F.2d at 297.
127. Monopoly pricing is permitted because it attracts competition. See L. SULLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrausT § 46, at 117 (1977).
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anticompetitive conduct."' 128
Because the wrongful conduct rule might be difficult to apply, the
court suggested that plaintiff estimate the monopolist's market share,
"but for" the monopolizing conduct. 129 Based on this estimate, the
court would assess the price that the defendant could charge with this
degree of market power. The difference between the actual price
charged and plaintiffs "but for" price estimate would represent the
amount attributable to the wrongful conduct.'
30
Although plaintiff would have difficulty in proving that monopoliz-
ing conduct, which occurred outside the limitations period, contributed
to the overcharge, plaintiff should not be denied the opportunity to es-
tablish a causal relation between the conduct and the overcharge.'
3
'
The court of appeals, however, stated that it would be unfair to re-
quire the monopolist to forfeit its legitimately acquired advantage and
be penalized by treble damages for engaging in conduct beyond a de
minimis level. 132 The court explained that the Sherman Act's tolerance
of lawfully acquired and maintained monopolies would be undercut if
Kodak were required to forfeit its success "because its power has
merely been supplemented by improper conduct."'' 33
IV. A COMPLICATED AND UNSOUND MEASURE OF DAMAGES
The lack of a clear definition of monopolizing conduct, coupled with
the fact that charging a monopoly price is not in itself unlawful, makes
courts reticent to impose treble damages.' 34 The court of appeals in
128. 603 F.2d at 297.
129. "We recognize that if the monopolist, but for its illegitimate actions, would have had little
or no market power, the wrongful conduct and competitive price rules may yield very similar
results. The proper standard, though, is one that bases damages on the monopolist's actual record
of misconduct." Id. at 298.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 297-98.
133. Id. at 298.
134. See notes 36, 105, 132, 133 supra and accompanying text; 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
supra note 3, at 1 630.
[W]here injury and causality are shown, damages (before trebling) should be limited to
that part of the injury reasonably attributable to the exclusionary conduct. The degree of
causation is, of course, difficult to determine.... The punitive nature of treble dam-
ages makes it wholly inappropriate to allow "full" recovery where exclusionary conduct
only partially contributed to monopoly power. Thus, purchasers from a monopolist
should not be entitled to treble the difference between the prices charged and a "compet-
itive" price, but only to treble the difference, if any, that exclusionary conduct can rea-
sonably be said to have caused.
[Vol. 59:173
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Berkey, in attempting to resolve these problems, departed from long
standing precedent that encourages vigorous private enforcement of the
antitrust laws. The court inappropriately applied Brunswick 135 to fash-
ion a measure of damages that is substantively unsound and unneces-
sarily complicated. Moreover, the victim in applying the measure bears
the risk of uncertainty created by the monopolist's unlawful acts.' 36
The plaintiffs in Brunswick sought damages that resulted from a
freely competitive market. 37  The Supreme Court in Brunswick ap-
plied standard tort causation principles 38 and held that lost profits
would be compensable only if they flowed from the predatory practices
of a deep pockets entry into the market.' 39 The court of appeals in
Berkey correctly recognized that excessive prices are the type of injury
the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. 40 The court interpreted the
phrase injury "that flows from that which makes defendant's act un-
lawful" to allow recovery of only the price increment that "flows from"
the distortion of the market. '4 '
The ability to charge a monopoly price depends on the possession of
monopoly power, which includes the power to control prices. 142 Price
Id. at 1 630, at 98-99.
135. 429 U.S. 477 (1977); see notes 39-43, 81-88 supra and accompanying text.
136. 603 F.2d at 298. "It may, of course, be difficult for a purchaser to demonstrate that
conduct. . . contributed to an overcharge. . . . That, however, is no reason for denying it the
opportunity to do so." Id But see 603 F.2d at 298 n.58 ("We express no view on how the trial
judge should allocate the burden of proving this causal relation, or lack of it, when plaintiff makes
a preliminary showing of persistent monopoly power and a substantial history of anticompetitive
conduct.").
137. 429 U.S. at 488.
[R]espondents complain that by acquiring the failing centers petitioner preserved compe-
tition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration. The
damages respondents obtained are designed to provide them with the profits they would
have realized had competition been reduced. The antitrust laws, however, were enacted
for "the protection of competition ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
138. See notes 88-92 supra and accompanying text.
139. 429 U.S. at 487.
140. 603 F.2d at 297.
141. Id.
142. Monopoly power is the power to control price and exclude competition. See note 31
supra.
The distinctive feature of an administered [monopoly] price situation is that prices, in-
stead of being registered automatically by the interaction of supply and demand forces in
an open market, are formulated in executive offices as matters of operating policy or
economic planning by officials of corporations . . . who, through their control over
blocks of capital resources.. . have considerable power to implement the price sched-
ules they adopt.
Washington University Open Scholarship
196 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
is causally related to the defendant's unlawful conduct if a company
exercises unlawfully acquired monopoly power to set a monopoly
price. 143 The court in Berkey, however, expanded the notion of causa-
tion to require plaintiff to prove a nexus between specific price incre-
ments and defendant's wrongful conduct. In effect the Berkey court
developed a theory of recovery based on defendant's culpability, rather
than plaintiffs injury. 144
The Berkey court's measure of damages is extremely complicated
and substantively unsound. The court of appeals recognized that mar-
ket power enables the monopolist to overcharge and that monopolizing
conduct directly enhances market power.145 The court suggested that
the relationship between wrongful acts and price increments could be
determined by calculating the market share absent any illegitimate con-
duct and the price that could be charged with that share of the mar-
ket. 146 The court's damage theory assumes the existence of two factors
that may not exist in every case of monopolizing behavior. First, the
court's analysis assumes a direct relationship between the monopolist's
degree of market power and the price charged by the monopolist."'
The relationship, however, exists only if the monopolist is maximizing
profit.' 48 The court's assumption of a direct relationship between the
monopolist's degree of market power and the monopoly price charged
is invalid because price increments are not directly related to actionable
Administered Prices, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 57 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. part 1, at 9 (1957) (statement of
Edwin G. Nourse) (hereinafter cited as administered prices).
143. Judge Frankel correctly recognized that an illegal monopolist's power to set price is the
"same species of evil ... as the unlawful power of conspirators to set their price." Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'dinpartandrev'dinpart,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). The court of appeals stated that
price, in the case of a conspiracy, is entirely attributable to the anticompetitive conduct, 603 F.2d
at 297. The illegal conspiracy gives the monopolist power and the power permits them to over-
charge or undercharge.
144. 'The proper standard, though, is one that bases damages on the monopolist's actual rec-
ord of misconduct." 603 F.2d at 298.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. A company may set prices at a level below that which would encourage others to enter
the market or advance their competitive position by adopting a predatory price that forces others
out of the market rather than improve their own profits. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST § 43 (1977).




behavior. Management, not illegal activity, establishes prices.14 9 If a
company's market power is sufficient to enable management to formu-
late price without regard to competition, then price reflects the rate of
return the company wants to receive.150 The firm, however, may not
wish to maximize profits, although the optimum monopoly price may
be much higher than the competitive price.'
If a company chooses to set a monopoly price that is not a profit
maximizing price, the allocation of the overcharge between good be-
havior and bad behavior is a serious problem for the court. For exam-
ple, if the monopolist charges $45 for a product whose competitive
price is $40 and whose maximizing price is $49, and the price the de-
fendant could have charged had it not monopolized the market is $45,
the second circuit's test indicates that the victim of a section 2 violation
will not receive any damages.
Second, the court's damage analysis assumes that the various aspects
of defendant's actionable conduct can be identified and attributed to
the creation of specific shares of the market. It is unlikely that a jury
could reasonably calculate the market share that would exist absent the
monopolizing conduct.'52 A monopoly acquired through production of
a superior product may be maintained by one small anticompetitive
practice."5 3 If only minimal anticompetitive conduct is necessary to
maintain or achieve power to control prices, the conduct is entirely re-
sponsible for the overcharge. The only relevant determination is
whether the incremental share of market power achieved by defend-
149. See Administered Prices, supra note 142. See also 457 F. Supp. at 423 n.24 (testimony of
Kodak witness).
Q. In connection with Kodak product pricing during this period of time.. . was con-
sideration given to the pricing of competitive products?
A. No. I don't really know what you're getting at. We didn't price, you know, with
consideration of other products that were on the market. We priced from what we
thought we could do the best and give us the greatest customer acceptance.
Q. As far as you know, has that continued to be the general pricing policy of Kokak?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Id.
150. See note 149 supra.
151. Posner, The Economic Theory of Monopoly and the Case for Antitrust, reprinted in T.
CALVANI & J. SIEGFRIED, ECONoMic ANALYSIS AND ANTrrRUST LAw 47 (1979).
152. See 48 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 643, 662-64 (1980) (market share analysis is inappropriate
because it may place too great a burden on plaintiffs).
153. Any one exclusionary act may seem trivial. Indeed, we shall often be unable to find
that several such acts, taken together, probably "caused" or contributed significantly to
defendant's power. Yet, such acts can determine the often marginal choice of an actual
or potential rival deciding whether to enter or expand.
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, at 626(c), at 78-79.
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ant's illegal acts resulted in the maintenance or acquisition of the power
to control prices.
If the power to control prices previously existed, the inquiry should
be whether "but for" the monopolizing activity, competitive inroads
would have resulted in the loss of the defendant's power to control
prices. If the anticompetitive practice had no effect on the market
power, plaintiff has not proven causation or fact of damage and a court
should not permit a customer to recover the monopoly price. 154 When
monopolizing conduct and superior products co-exist, the wrongdoer,
not the victim, must bear the risk of uncertainty necessary to establish
the causal relationship.1 55 If monopolizing conduct is responsible for
either the acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, causation is
established.'56 The amount of damages in this situation should be the
entire amount of the overcharge because the monopolizing conduct
damaged the customer in this amount. Monopolists should not be per-
mitted to retain the fruits of their illegalities.
The trial court in Berkey applied the only practical and correct meas-
ure of damages.157 The court of appeals in fashioning a new measure
of damages failed to consider the practical difficulties involved in relat-
ing price movements to monopolizing conduct. More importantly, the
Second Circuit did not account for the purposes of the antitrust laws-
compensation of the victim, deterrence, and simplification of actions to
encourage suits-in fashioning a damages measure.
Patricia . Gray
154. Areeda and Turner suggest that an exclusionary act should significantly contribute to
creating or maintaining monopoly power in order to be causally related. Id.
155. See notes 60-73 supra and accompanying text.
156. 603 F.2d at 298 n.58. The court of appeals in Berkey expressed no opinion as to the
allocation of the burden of proof once monopoly power and anticompetitive acts are shown. Id.
157. The district court applied the appropriate measure of damages:
The power to fix prices is after all the gist of monopoly power. When that power is
unlawfully obtained or employed, the monopolist pursues the same proximate goal for
himself as the price-fixing conspirators aim to share together. It accords with settled tort
principles to hold the wrongdoer for the intended and proximate consequences of his
conduct.
457 F. Supp. at 423. This measure does not add additional complexities, which would deter suits
by private individuals, and would not allow wrongdoers to retain the fruits of their illegalities.
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